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Despite nearly three decades of revolutionary government rule in Iran poverty and
inequality remain the central issues of political debate in Iran. Economic dissatisfaction,
which led to electoral upset by a populist candidate in the 2005 presidential election,
has been widely attributed to rising poverty and inequity. Using household survey data
I describe the trends in poverty and inequality for the last three decades and show
that this thesis is not grounded in facts. The evidence shows that poverty, having
substantially declined in recent years, is quite low by international standards and in
comparison to pre-revolution years. Inequality improved signi¯cantly immediately after
the Revolution but has remained relatively stable during the last 15 years. Signi¯cantly,
poverty sharply declined and inequality decreased somewhat in the ¯ve years leading
up to the election. Increased welfare of the poor over the period is also evident in
access to basic services, such as electricity and safe water, as well as in ownership
of household appliances. The wide gap between the evidence presented here, which
shows improvement in the welfare of the poor, and popular sentiments in Iran, which
indicate worsening poverty and inequality, raises important questions about the political
economy of redistribution in Iran. I suggest that in the context of a distributive economy
such as Iran's, in which wealth accumulation is seen to depend more on political access
than individual productivity, more subjective feelings of envy and fairness may matter
more than objective indicators of poverty and inequality.
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11 Introduction
The unexpected landslide victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran's presidential election
in 2005 has been attributed to voters' concern with poverty and economic injustice.1 His
populist platform promising a more equitable distribution of the oil wealth{\take the oil
money to people's dinner table"{appears to have resonated more widely with voters than
calls for democracy from his better known reformist rivals. Since his election, president
Ahmadinejad has moved quickly to solidify his political base into a wider social movement
which is being described as \the second wave" of the Islamic Revolution. Many observers
attribute Ahmadinejad's ascent, in the words of one commentator, to \frustration with
widening income gaps" and widespread poverty which \propels Iran toward extremist poli-
tics."2 The shock of Ahmadijezad's election has shifted conventional wisdom on the roots of
political discontent in Iran away from lack of democracy to poverty and inequality. Populism
can feed on poverty and inequality, but in the case of Ahmadinejad in Iran, the premise
for the claim simply does not hold: there is no evidence that the poor have lost ground in
recent years, that the Revolution has generally failed its most ardent supporters{the poor,
nor that inequality has been on the increase.
Attributing the revival of populist politics in Iran to rising poverty and inequality raises
important questions about the impact of the Islamic Revolution on the poor who formed its
social base. The revolution's leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, repeatedly declared that the rev-
olution belonged to the disinherited (mostazafan) and the barefooted (paberehnegan), and
promised large scale redistribution of income and wealth (Behdad 2000 and Saeidi 2001).3
However, populist politics seemed lost color as the war with Iraq ended and economic and
political reform under the Rafsanjani (189-1996) and Khatami (1997-2004) administrations
1Michael Ignatie®, \Iranian lessons," New York Times, July 17, 2005; Abbas Milani, \Regime change",
Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2005; Amuzegar (2005), Ghamari (2005), and (Sazgara 2006).
2Afshin Molavi, New York Times, November 3, 2005.
3The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is quite explicit in committing the government to
provide for the poor. Article 29 considers it a person's right to have access to \social protection in retirement,
unemployment, old age, disability, ..., which the government is committed to provide."
2gradually shifted the social agenda from distribution to growth. It has been suggested that
the return to the populism of the early years of the Revolution under Ahmadinejad is in
part a rejection of the economic reform programs of the previous sixteen years (Ghamari
2005) or of emphasis on reform in general over poverty reduction. Does this imply that the
Revolution has failed to deliver on its promises to the poor or that inequality has worsened
with economic growth? In this paper I examine the record of the past three decades us-
ing extensive survey data to determine how poverty and inequality have changed since the
1970s.
My ¯ndings question conventional wisdom that poverty and inequality are the root
cause of economic discontent in present day Iran or of the recent rise in populism. The
evidence shows that poverty has declined substantially compared to the years just before
the Revolution, and, signi¯cantly, most of the decline has occurred during the the past 15
years when reforms have been under way. The poverty rate (de¯ned as the proportion of
individuals under $2 per day) has been in the single digits in the last several years, which
is quite low by the standards of developing countries, and one-eighths its rate before the
Revolution. Inequality fell immediately after the Revolution but has remained steady for
the past two decades. Interestingly, populist economic policies of the 1980s appear to have
failed to shield the poor from the ravages of the war and collapse of oil exports in the
1980s. Both poverty and inequality deteriorated in the 1980s. But perhaps the most gain
in the quality of life for the poor has been in access to basic services, such as electricity and
safe water. These improvements in welfare are closely related to improvements in health,
fertility, and education outcomes which have been documented elsewhere (Abbasi-Shavazi
et al. 2002, Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000, Salehi-Isfahani 2005).
Shifting priorities and changing policies during the nearly two and a half decades of
Islamic rule has made it di±cult to conclude, for voters as well as for researchers, how to
assign credit for gains by the poor. The Islamic Revolution no doubt played a role. The
overthrow of monarchy in 1979 happened with enough force to disturb existing social and
3economic relations. Wide ranging expropriation and nationalization in the name of the poor
helped qualify the 1979 change of regime as a social revolution.4 Pro-poor policies such as
rural electri¯cation and rationing of a wide range of commodities were implemented during
the ¯rst decade of the Revolution, in part to help mobilize large numbers of volunteers,
mostly from poorer neighborhoods, to ¯ght in the war with Iraq. Direct assistance to the
poor through a network of semi-public charities, the largest of which is the Komiteh Emdad,
was also e®ective in poverty reduction (Esfahani 2005). Perhaps the most lasting in°uence
of the Revolution has been to move the Iranian social contract closer to the special brand of
Middle Eastern populism which Yousef (2004) has called the \interventionist-redistributive
social contract" (see also World Bank 2004). In terms of bene¯ts for the poor, though there
were some immediate improvements in poverty (see below) and the distribution of income
(Behdad 1989), there is little evidence that the Revolution improved the lot of the poor
during its ¯rst decade (Nowshirvani and Clawson 1994).
The economic reforms which were put in place after the war rolled back some distri-
butional policies of the early years of the revolution, notably dismantling the commodity
rationing system, but stopped short of reducing the considerable level of social protection
o®ered through subsidies and the labor market. The reforms on the whole encouraged pri-
vate enterprise, but failed to signi¯cantly privatize the economy. In particular, they did not
a®ect the semi-public agencies that provide social assistance to the poor that sprang up af-
ter the Revolution (Esfahani 2005). But perhaps the most e®ective anti-poverty program of
the Rafsanjani administration was the ambitious rural health and family planning program,
which has earned high marks from international institutions (Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000).
Rising oil income has also played a key role in lowering poverty, especially since 1999, when
the economy has grown by about 5 percent per year thanks to rising oil prices. Oil-induced
growth in post-revolution Iran appears to have been good for the poor, lifting many our of
poverty and even increasing their share in income.
4For a description of expropriation and interventionist policies in the early years of the Revolution see,
Behdad (1989) and Nomani and Behdad (2006)
4I rely on extensive survey data in unit records on household and individual expenditures
for a thirty year period extending from before the 1979 Revolution to 2004. There are a few
published studies of poverty and income distribution available in English, but none that
cover the last ten years. Mehran (1975) and Pesaran (1976) analyze the distribution of
income in the 1970s, and Behdad (1989) and Nowshirvani and Clawson (1994) in the 1980s.
Assadzadeh and Paul (2004) analyze changes in poverty during 1984-1993, but there are
no studies to my knowledge of the extent of poverty for the period before the Revolution.
There are a number of papers in Persian on poverty and inequality, but because they employ
varying methodologies and reaches widely di®erent conclusions, they have failed to present
us with a consistent picture for the post Revolution period. The government which collects
and publishes an enormous amount of survey data, such as those used in this paper, has
not measured or tracked poverty systematically. It has only recently started to publish an
o±cial poverty line. As a result, widely varying poverty rates are quoted inside and outside
Iran inhibiting the development of a useful public debate in Iran.5
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the trends in national
output per head and in personal incomes and expenditures. This section uses widely avail-
able macroeconomic data and household survey data to show that economic well being has,
on average, been restored to its pre-Revolution level. This ¯nding provides the context for
comparisons of poverty and inequality in later sections. Section 3 provides an international
comparison of poverty and inequality to show that Iran's position relative to its peers is
quite favorable. Low poverty rates and average inequality rates question the a direct link
between Iranian populism and economic injustice as it has been argued for Latin Ameri-
can countries. Section 4 discusses the trend in poverty, and section 5 traces the same for
inequality. Section 6 shows the extent of access to basic services such as safe water and
electricity, and ownership of home appliances. Section 7 discusses the implications of the
5See, for example, Raisdana et al. (2000) and Amuzegar (2005). Published poverty rates in o±cial
sources in English also vary widely, ranging from 7.2% in World Bank (2005), to 20% in United Nations
(2003), and to 40% in Central Intelligence Agency (2005).
5¯ndings in view of the importance of distributional issues in Iranian politics.
2 The rise and fall of the standard of living in Iran
The 1979 Revolution broke a twenty-year long period of rising living standards, making
the post-Revolution economic decline seem like an unprecedented disaster. During 1960-77,
GDP per capita grew at 6.6 percent per year, allowing it to treble in just one generation.6
By 1988, after the post-Revolution chaos, the 1980-88 war with Iraq, and the oil price
collapse of 1986 had worked their way through the economic system, GDP per capita was
only one-half of its 1977 level. Fifteen years later economic growth had brought incomes
back to their pre-Revolution peak.
Figures 1 and 2 depict the rise and fall of incomes during the 1955-2004 period.7 As these
¯gures show, economic decline came in at least two stages, marked by di®erent but closely
timed events. First came the disruptions following the 1979 Revolution itself. These began
with worker strikes in 1978 and continued for several years afterwards with nationalizations
of banks and large enterprizes and disruptions in worker-management relations (Bayat 1987,
Behdad 1989, Amuzegar 1993). A year and a half later came the Iraqi invasion of Iran,
which lasted for eight years and wrecked the local economy in south-western Iran, caused
major damage to productive infrastructure in other places in the country, and disrupted oil
production and exports. Finally, the oil price collapse of 1986 reduced the price of Iran's
main export to one-third, e®ectively ending the oil price boom that had started a dozen
years earlier in 1973. According to all three series, per capita GDP reached its peak before
6I use a single Georgian calendar year to refer to the Iranian year which begins on March 21 of that year
and ends on March 20 of the following year.
7 Figure 1 uses national income data from three sources, Penn World Tables (Summers, Heston, and
Aten 2002), World Development Indicators (WDI) World Bank (2005), and the Central Bank of Iran (CBI).
The ¯rst two series correct for di®erences in the cost of living between Iran and the United States by using
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates. They are both expressed in constant prices (1996 for Penn
and 2000 for WDI). GDP per capita and private consumption which are from CBI are in constant 1997 rials.
The WDI and CBI series track each other very closely, while the Penn series shows higher GDP per capita
in the 1990s. Figure 2 is based on survey data. See Tables 6 and 7 in Appendix B for the data used to
produce these graphs.
6the Revolution in 1976, at $7976 international dollars (WDI series, 2000 prices).8 By the
end of the war in 1988, it had fallen to $4156, a decline of 48 percent compared to its peak
in 1976 and about where it had stood twenty years earlier. By 2004, economic growth which
started after the end of the war had brought GDP per capita back to $6983, which is where
it was in 1975 according to WDI series.
From the viewpoint of the national economy, the extent of economic decline is breathtak-
ing, especially considering the rapid pace of growth that it reversed (Figure 1). Reversals of
fortune of this magnitude in such a short period are rare in modern history.However, from
the viewpoint of private consumption (Figure 1) or household income and expenditures
Figure (2), the rise and fall of living standards appears much less dramatic.9 Private con-
sumption (according to national income data) grew at 4.5 percent between 1960-77, which
is about 2 percentage points less than GDP per capita, but was down by only 23 percent in
1988 compared to its peak in 1977. Growth of per capita consumption during 1997-2004,
at 4.6 percent per year, compares well with the 1960-77 experience. By 2004, per capita
consumption had surpassed its level in the 1970s and GDP per capita was near its peak in
1977, while poverty was lower in 2004 compared to 1977.
Three points are worth noting based on the evidence presented in this section. First,
with no increase in GDP per capita, a lower poverty rate in 2004 compared to 1975 is
evidence of improvement in the relative standing of the poor if not of overall equality over
the last 30 years (more on this later). Second, despite the recovery of GDP per capita and
private consumption in recent years, the memory of the harsh times of the 1980s continues
to haunt many Iranians. This is re°ected in exaggerated comparisons of pre- and post-
Revolution living standards, a favorite pastime for middle class Iranians, which appears in
8To compare the actual levels indicated for 1976 by the di®erent series we can convert them all to 2000
prices using PPP in°ation rates in World Bank (2005): $6313 for Penn, $7,976 for WDI, and $8072 for CBI
(7,051,200 rials divided by the PPP exchange rate of 917 for 1997 and multiplied by 1.05 in°ation factor
between 1997-2000).
9Household expenditure and income data are taken from the annual Household Expenditure and Income
Surveys (HEIS) conducted by the Statistical Center of Iran. Because their reports are published separately
for rural and urban areas, I have not produced the average for the country as a whole.
7Figure 1: GDP per capita according to di®erent sources of data, 1955-2005




















































Notes: Left axis: GDPPC Penn (GDP per capita, RGDPCH, Penn World Tables Mark 6.1, 1996 PPP US
dollars), and GDPPC WDI (World Bank, 2000 PPP US dollars). PPP dollars correct for di®erences in
purchasing power between Iran and the United States. Right axis, GDPPC CBI (Central Bank of Iran,
thousand 1997 rials), PrivateCPC (private consumption per capita, thousand 1997 rials). See also footnote
7.
Sources: Summers, Heston, and Aten (2002), World Bank (2005), Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report,
various years.
Figure 2: Average real daily per capita expenditures, 1974-2004 (2004 rials)
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Notes: Average household expenditures divided by average household size and converted to 2004 prices
using the consumer price indices for rural and urban areas.
Source: Statistical Center of Iran, HEIS reports, various years.
8accounts of visiting journalists.10
Third, as Figure 2 shows, the rural economy has been remarkably insulated from the
°uctuations in the rest of the economy.11 While the urban economy was on the roller coaster
ride of boom and bust, the average rural family did not directly experience the great boom
of the 1970s nor the big crash in the 1980s. Their loss in terms stagnant incomes for an entire
generation (1974-2000) is nevertheless quite severe. Positive movement in rural consumption
started to appear in the mid 1990s when per capita consumption ¯rst started to crawl up
and then, between 1999-2004, it accelerated. During this period, which corresponds to the
Third Development Plan, rural consumption grew at par with urban consumption, at 6.7
percent per year. Despite parity in terms of growth in recent years, over the longer period
since the end of the war the gap between rural and urban areas has widened. The gap
tends to narrow during periods of economic decline, as in the mid 1980s, and widen with
growth, as in the period since the end of the war. The ratio of rural to urban consumption
reached its lowest value of 0.45 in 1975, a year of maximum prosperity, and its peak in
1989, a low point in the last thirty years. The ratio has °uctuated round 0.5 in recent
years. The widening of the gap during period of growth may be because more able rural
workers migrate to cities, leaving behind the old and the less well o® families. Since the
rural-urban gap is one of the most important sources of inequality, reduction in overall
inequality in the country may not happen until rural incomes catch up.
3 International comparison of poverty and inequality
The economic despair reported in press accounts of Iran and noted above is quite at odds
with how Iran compares with other countries in terms of poverty and inequality. It appears
10According to one report, \in real terms, Iranians earn one-fourth of what they did earn [before the 1979
Revolution]" (emphasis added), Afshin Molavi, \Economic Ills Fuel Iranian Dissent," The Washington Post,
July 8, 2003, A. 13. Another report lowers the decline to one-third, \Today, real per capita income is a
third of what it was before the Revolution" (Molavi 2004), and still another account lowers it to one-half,
\income today is less than half the prerevolutionary level." (Sazgara 2006)
11It is partly for this reason that in this paper, where possible, I present consumption expenditures for
rural and urban households separately.
9that the dramatic economic swings of the last three decades that have dealt a serious blow
to the aspiration of middle class Iranians have left the poor in Iran in a respectable position
compared to other developing countries. Comparisons of poverty levels are more di±cult
than inequality because there are no satisfactory ways to compare living standards, and
therefore poverty thresholds, across countries whereas objective statistical yardsticks to
compare level of inequality exist. Reported poverty rates (proportion living in poverty) for
Iran vary greatly because di®erent authors and institutions de¯ne di®erent levels for the
poverty line. For example, United Nations (2003, 6) reports that 20 percent of Iranians
lived under poverty in 2003, which is a fair statement given the poverty line they assume:
about 8800 rials ($3.60 in international dollars) per person per day, which is quite a bit
higher than the one and two dollars per day commonly used for international comparisons.
World Bank (2005) reports poverty (and inequality) measures for a number of countries,
including Iran, using the standards of $1 and $2 per person per day. Table 1 compares
poverty and inequality in Iran with a number of countries of interest: Egypt and Turkey,
the two other large countries in the Middle East besides Iran; Mexico and Venezuela, two
oil exporting countries from Latin America; China, India and Pakistan, poorer but fast
growing countries of Asia; and Malaysia, a predominantly Muslim country with a dynamic
economy. The data are for 1998-2001, the closest neighboring years for which comparable
data were available.
In terms of poverty, Iran compares well with the countries in this table. The proportions
of individuals under $2 per day is 7.2 percent in Iran, which is lower than Malaysia, Mexico
and Turkey, whose average incomes are the same or higher than Iran's. Not surprisingly,
Iran's poverty rate is considerably lower than the poorer countries of China, Egypt, India,
and Pakistan. In terms of inequality, as measured by the Gini index, Iran is about average
(0.43) for this group of countries. The poorer countries of Egypt, India, and Pakistan have
lower inequality (0.30-0.35), but Iran's index is lower than countries with similar income
(0.49 and 0.54 for Malaysia and Mexico) except for Turkey (0.40). In short, following a
10Table 1: International comparison of poverty and inequality
Country GDP PC Poverty rate Gini index
in 2003 % under $2
Iran 6608 7.2 (1998) 43.0 (1998)
Egypt 3731 43.9 (1999) 34.4 (2000)
Turkey 6398 10.3 (2000) 40.0 (2000)
China 4726 50.1 (1999) 44.7 (2001)
India 2732 80.6 (1999) 32.5 (2000)
Pakistan 1981 65.6 (1998) 33.0 (1999)
Venezuela 4647 30.6 (1998) 49.1 (1998)
Mexico 8661 26.3 (2000) 54.6 (2000)
Malaysia 8986 9.3 (1997) 49.2 (1997)
Note: GDP per capita is in constant 2000 international (PPP) dollars, and the poverty rate is the percentage
of individuals living under $2 per day.
Source: World Bank (2005).
tumultuous post-revolution period, judged by the standards of this group of developing
countries, Iran's poverty rate is quite low and its inequality is about average.
4 Poverty
4.1 De¯ning a poverty line for Iran
The literature on the meaning and measurement of poverty is extensive and contentious
(Bhalla 2002), and extends beyond economics (Sen 1999). It is generally agreed, however,
that measures of poverty based on what individuals spend on their livelihood serve an im-
portant purpose in monitoring of poverty. Poverty thresholds based on surveys of individual
income and expenditures therefore form the mainstay of poverty measurement. In this sec-
tion I compute such thresholds using household expenditure data.12 In section 6 I consider
the extent to which the poor have bene¯ted from increased access to basic services which
in°uence the quality of their life over and above what they spend on themselves.
Following accepted practice, I measure poverty using a poverty threshold based on ex-
12For a description of the data see Appendix A.
11penditures reported in household surveys. Estimates of household expenditures are gener-
ally preferred to income because personal incomes are recorded less accurately. Measure-
ment of farm income and the self employed in the informal sector di±cult and, in addition,
individuals maybe unwilling to disclose their incomes if they identify interviewers as tax of-
¯cials. Expenditures are on the other hand calculated from answers to numerous questions
related to speci¯c items which do not directly reveal a person's income. I use a poverty
threshold (or poverty line) based on the level of expenditures per person for an average
household whose food outlays allows each member to consume a minimum level of calories
per day (about 2200). This is the basic approach which has been used in Iran by Pajouyan
(1994), Tabibian (2000), and Salehi-Isfahani (2003), among others. The poverty line is
thus measured by the average expenditures for a group of households whose food intake
amounts to about 2200 calories per day (see Table 2). A closely related method, employed
by Assadzadeh and Paul (2004), calculates the cost of a given minimum nutritional bundle
at current market prices and augments it by the proportion of non-food expenditures at the
sample mean.13
Studies that measure poverty in Iran use the Household Expenditure and Income Surveys
collected every year by the Statistical Center of Iran.14 These surveys ask households about
their expenditures in the last 30 days or the last 12 months, depending on the type of
expenditure, but do not ask about consumption. The di®erence between expenditure and
consumption can be large, especially for some rural households who buy their food in bulk
at harvest time.15 Table 2 compares various estimates of poverty lines in rials per person
per day (to convert to international dollars, divide by the PPP exchange rate rials given on
the last row of the table). The estimates from each source is for a speci¯c year, which I have
13There is no best way to calculate non-food expenditures that correspond to a minimum calorie bundle.
See Ravallion (1992) for a survey of methods for measuring poverty thresholds using food and non-food
expenditures.
14See Appendix A for a description of these surveys.
15In 2001, about 24 percent of rural families bought more than 500 kilograms of grain in the month of
interview. So, in that month the mere purchase of this amount of grain may have placed them above the
poverty line, even if they were in fact poor if the expenditure were annualized (Salehi-Isfahani 2003).
12Table 2: Various poverty lines for selected years (per person per day, in current rials)
1977 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004
Urban
MPO 75.8 210.4 535.7 1444.5 4327.4 8625.6
Assadzadeh & Paul 95.6 265.2 675.5 1824.9 5456.8 10885.7
Tabibian 85.2 236.4 603.3 1627.5 4864.2 9707.2
Pajouyan 66.4 184.3 468.2 1396.4 4819.4 7547.4
Salehi-Isfahani 73.9 205.0 521.6 1406.0 4204.4 8401.4
Rural
MPO 42.4 122.3 311.1 837.8 2504.8 4996.4
Assadzadeh & Paul 67.4 194.2 430.5 1160.4 3869.0 7678.6
Tabibian 47.6 137.5 304.8 823.4 2739.6 5446.2
Pajouyan 50.5 145.6 323.6 1049.7 2795.5 5775.7
Salehi-Isfahani 50.9 146.5 325.2 881.1 2929.7 5805.5
PPP exchange rate 32.4 89.9 157.1 481.5 1118.2 2775.3
Note: Estimates of poverty lines were extended to other years using the CPI's for rural and urban areas.
The PPP exchange rate for 1977 is not available the 1984 rate
Sources (and the year for which the estimate was made): Management and Planning Organization (2000),
1998; Pajouyan (2000), 1995; Tabibian (2000), 1996; Salehi-Isfahani (2003), 2001.
extended to other years using the consumer price indices for rural and urban areas. There
is a fair amount of agreement among these estimates of poverty threshold and in later years
they generally exceed the $2 per person per day which is the international benchmark. In
section 4, to economize on space, I use only the $2 per day and the Assadzadeh-Paul rates;
the former because it is an international benchmark, and the latter because it represents
the upper bound on poverty threshold in Table 2 and because its source is published in
English.
4.2 Household vs. individual level poverty rates
The purpose of most poverty measurement is to determine the proportion of individuals
below a certain level of per capita expenditures or income. In Iran poverty rates are often
de¯ned as the proportion of households below a household poverty threshold, which tends to
overestimate poverty at the level of the individual, because households with lower expendi-
ture and incomes are generally smaller than average (see Table 3). Household level poverty
13Table 3: The relationship between household size and household expenditures
Decile of Household size
expenditure 1984 1994 2004
1 2.70 3.11 2.98
2 4.47 4.72 3.88
3 5.02 5.09 4.27
4 5.47 5.27 4.42
5 5.68 5.51 4.55
6 5.76 5.58 4.61
7 5.83 5.63 4.74
8 5.91 5.80 4.65
9 5.91 5.77 4.77
10 6.04 5.89 4.63
Total 5.28 5.24 4.35
Source: Author's calculations, HEIS
rates further complicate interpreting the trend in poverty because the relationship between
household size and expenditure class in Iran has changed over time. As seen in Table 3,
average household size in the poorest three deciles of household expenditures rose during
1984-94 before declining to 2004, while it declined continuously for richer households.
For 1984 and later years when unit record data are available,16 individual-level poverty
rates are easily calculated. For earlier years, for which I have to rely on the published survey
results, whenever the distribution of household size by expenditure or income group has been
reported, I have used the information to estimate individual poverty rates. Furthermore,
because the poverty lines I use do not necessarily correspond to the expenditure thresholds in
the published results, I estimated poverty rates by assuming a linear relationships between
the number of individuals within an expenditure category and the level of expenditures.
The results are presented below in Figure ?? and in Table 9 in Appendix B.
16Assadzadeh and Paul (2004) identify their ¯rst expenditure survey as 1983, but to my knowledge the
1983 survey is not available in unit record and from the sample characteristics it seems that they are actually
using the Iranian year 1363 (1984/85) survey.
144.3 The trend in poverty
Measuring changes in poverty is fortunately much less contentious than measuring it for a
given year. All poverty indicators based on HEIS surveys reveal the same trend because
the relative position of the cumulative distributions of expenditures for di®erent years are
generally characterized by stochastic dominance. Thus, any poverty line applied consistently
to all years would show the same trend. To see this, consider the distributions of per capita
expenditures depicted in Figure 3 for the most recent years, which is a period of economic
growth. The vertical poverty lines show the poverty rates (the so-called Head Count Ratio)
by the vertical height of the distribution functions, which is the proportion of individuals
with expenditures below that level. Because the distribution functions do not intersect
(stochastic dominance) and are positioned to right for later years, no matter where we
place the poverty line, the Head Count Ratio declines over time. This graph also shows
that the proportion of the population under poverty is adequate for describing the trend
in poverty. More complex indices, such as the poverty gap index, which are more sensitive
to the depth of poverty and changes in the lower tail of the distribution and are therefore
generally preferred to the Head Count Ratio, would tell the same story of change in poverty
over time. This is because the shape of the expenditure distribution function at the lower
tail has remained relatively contestant over time.
As noted earlier, to track changes in poverty over the 1974-2004 period I use the standard
$2 per day rate converted to rials at the PPP exchange rate for each year, and the poverty
line for 1994 used in Assadzadeh and Paul (2004){henceforth AP{and generalized to other
years using the consumer price indices for rural and urban areas.17 These poverty lines
represent the two extremes in Table 2, but once extended to the 1970s they switch sides.
A major di®erence between the two thresholds is that the $2 per day is the same for
rural and urban areas, whereas AP allows for di®erent rates. Neither measure of poverty
fully takes into account the e®ect on poverty of subsidies for food, energy and medicine,
17See Chen and Ravallion (2001) for a discussion of this methodology.






































Notes: Per capita expenditures are in logs of 2004 rials. Source: Author's calculations using Household
Expenditure and Income Surveys for 2000-04.
16which account for an important part of the poor's expenditures. Subsidies are only partly
re°ected in my calculations of poverty rates because I de°ate nominal expenditures with the
Consumer Price Index, which is optimized for the basket of goods purchased by the average
consumer. Since the poor spend a greater proportion of their incomes on subsidized goods,
my calculations may under-estimate the decline in poverty. This is contrary to the usual
argument that contends that in°ation adjustments would show greater poverty (Amuzegar
2005).18 I checked for the sensitivity of the results by de°ating instead with price indices for
food and clothing, which may be closer to the in°ation experienced by most poor families.
Because the food and overall CPI are closely correlated, the results did not change.
Figure ?? shows the Head Count Ratio for the period 1977-2004 for households and
individuals and for rural and urban areas (the actual numbers are in Tables 8 and 9 in
Appendix B). The top two graphs show the proportion of households and the bottom
graphs show the proportion of individuals below poverty according to each de¯nition of
poverty.19 The trends in all four graphs are similar, showing decline in poverty immediately
after the Revolution, followed by a sharp rise in the latter half of the 1980s, and declining
thereafter.20
In 1977 about 28 percent of urban households and 25 percent of urban individuals
were below poverty, according to both AP and $2 poverty lines. For rural households the
proportion was 43 percent according to AP and 66 percent according to the $2 poverty
line, and for rural individuals 43 and 60 percent, respectively. For the early years of the
18The argument that the poor have been squeezed hard by in°ation is not supported by the evidence. In
addition to direct evidence of rising incomes presented in this paper, we notice that rising real income has
allowed the poor to diversify their expenditures, in particular to spend more on non-food items. For the
lowest decile of per capita expenditures, the share of non-food expenditures in total household expenditures
has increased steadily during the period under study, from 40 percent in 1984 to 44 percent in 1994 to 50
percent in 2004.
19As noted earlier, the household rates are directly taken from SCI publications. For example, in 1977,
SCI reports 64 percent of households spent under 15,000 rials per year, which is about $2 per day using the
PPP rate of 46.5 rials per dollar and the reported average family of 5.43 for this expenditure group. The
lower individual poverty rate of 59 percent for 1977 is because poorer households were smaller in size.
20The $2 poverty line yields higher rates in the 1970s compared to AP but lower in later years. The
reversal has to do with the way the PPP exchange rate (which drives changes in rial value of the $2 poverty
line) varies relative to the Consumer Price Index (which drives changes in the AP line).
17Revolution measurement of poverty rates is less precise because expenditure surveys were
not conducted in some years (no urban survey in 1978, and 1981-83, and no rural surveys
in 1979-81 and 1983), and the poverty rates reported here are reconstructed from tabulated
rather than micro data. Household-level poverty rates show uniform decline between 1977-
1982, but individual-level rates are less clear and less pronounced. According to the $2
poverty line in 1982 individual-level rural poverty had declined to 40 percent from 59 percent
in 1977, but according to the AP poverty line it was only 9 percentage points lower, and
even slightly higher compared to 1978.
Poverty rates rose sharply in the mid 1980s as incomes plummeted with the intensi¯-
cation of the war with Iraq and the collapse of oil prices (see Figures 1 and 2). According
to the AP poverty line the rural individual poverty rate peaked at 47 percent in 1988 and
urban poverty rate at 40 percent in 1989. Evidently, the wide ranging system of rationing
intended to shield the poor against price increases and shortages was not su±cient to keep
poverty from rising in the face of diminished resources. During the war years the govern-
ment had instituted a wide ranging system of rationing for basic goods, which was informally
extended to most commodities from refrigerators to construction materials, some of which
were procured from centers located in mosques. One possible reason for the rising level of
poverty in the mid 1980s may be accelerating in°ation, rising from 7 percent in 1985 to 24
percent in 1986, pushing up the estimated poverty line.21 Another reason is that because
of the nation's focus on the war e®ort, delivery of goods and services to the poor was still
not a priority. The delivery of key basic services (roads, electri¯cation, and health) to rural
areas did not really take o® until the war had ended.
With the end of the war in July 1988, the rising price of oil in international markets
during the ¯rst Persian Gulf war of 1990-91 and the start of reconstruction in 1989 poverty
began to decline, falling by one quarter by 1993. This decline was brie°y interrupted in the
21A shift in the poor's expenditures toward rationed goods might have protected them. But since we only
focus on expenditures de°ated with CPI, we do not know to what extent such substitution helped allay their
falling incomes.


















































Notes: The USD2.00 per day poverty line is converted to rials using the purchasing power parity exchange
rates), and the calorie-based poverty line is from Assadzadeh and Paul (2004), extended to other years using
the CPI.
Source: Statistical Center of Iran, Household Expenditure and Income Surveys, for 1977-83 based on SCI
publications, and 1984-2004, author's calculations.
mid 1990s as a result of an economic crisis precipitated by an external debt crisis (Pesaran
2000). However, poverty soon resumed its decline, falling to single digits in 2004. According
to the $2 poverty line, in 2004 of only 1 percent of urban individuals and 7 percent of rural
individuals were poor; the rates according to the AP poverty line were about 11 and 17
percent. Thus, in 2004, according to the higher AP poverty line (about $3.3 per person
per day) about 12.7 percent of the population{8.9 million individuals{were poor, while
according to the lower $2 line only 3.3 percent or 2 million individuals were poor.
The trend depicted in Figure ?? has important implications for the political economy
19questions I raised in the introduction to this paper. First, the large di®erence between
poverty rates in 1977 and 2004 is an indication that the Revolution has had a profound
impact on the welfare of Iran's poorest families. Since per capita incomes in 1977 and
2004 were about the same, the lower poverty rate must be due to the e®ect of signi¯cant
improvement in equality, at least at the lower end of the distribution. Overall equality, to
be discussed below, shows improvement between 1977 and 2004, but it is far more stable
than poverty. To the extent that the reduction in poverty is attributed to the pro-poor and
pro-rural policies after the Revolution, one would expect that the Islamic regime has its
supporters. The quality of life for millions of people, especially in rural areas, has improved
signi¯cantly thanks to large scale investments in rural electri¯cation, rural health, family
planning and education that took place in the 1980s and 1990s (Shakoori 2001). Agricultural
support prices after the war also helped to increase farm incomes (Mojtahed and Esfahani
1989), and subsidies for basic commodities protected the poor in rural and urban areas.
Second, these results question the suggestion that pro-market reforms during the Raf-
sanjani and Khatami administrations left the poor behind, and thus contributed to the
reformists' electoral defeat in June 2005. As it happens, the largest declines in poverty
coincided with periods of reform, suggesting that, to the contrary, reforms may have been
good for the poor. The critics often point to rise in poverty during the mid 1990s as evidence
that the pro-market reforms (often labeled as structural adjustment to give it a neo-liberal
twist) were anti-poor. But poverty actually fell during the ¯rst Rafsanjani adminstration
in 1989-94 and only rose after market reforms stalled, in part in response to the external
debt crisis in 1993. Oil revenues were falling during the second half of the 1990s (oil prices
in 1998 were only one-third their level in 1991) and, more importantly, imports were cut by
half to manage the balance of payments crisis (Pesaran 2000).
Finally, the trend in poverty highlights the role of oil income in °uctuations in the
incidence of poverty. With the exception of the 1996-99 period, when oil prices actually
fell, all other periods of decline in poverty coincided with rising oil prices. This is true of
20the 1990-92 spell, as well as the most recent decline during 2000-04, when rising oil prices
helped the economy grow by about 5 percent per year, bringing poverty down sharply.
In theory, the idea that rising oil income, as distinct from other types of macroeconomic
stimuli, tends to reduce poverty is rather straightforward. Higher government expenditures
increase aggregate demand, which disproportionately bene¯ts non-traded sectors such as
services and construction, which employ a signi¯cant proportion of unskilled workers and
raises their wages. At the same time, the in°ow of foreign exchange helps increase supply
of traded consumer goods, especially food, and thereby prevent the CPI from increasing at
par with nominal wages. Government subsidies for food, energy, and medicine help further
to prevent in°ation from eroding the purchasing power of the poor. It is indeed di±cult to
imagine how, with the vast system of subsidies in place, rising oil revenues could have led to
the ranks of the poor in Iran to swell. The well-known phenomenon of immiserizing growth
(Bhagwati 1958), which is sometimes associated with increased poverty happens because
economic growth is associated with deteriorating not improving terms of trade. Thus, the
insistence of many Iranian observers that poverty has been on the rise is in some cases a
mere extension of the immiserizing growth hypothesis to the case of oil-exporting countries,
to which the theory does not apply.22 If there is any transfer away from the poor as a result
of an oil boom, it is from the poor in oil importing countries to citizens of oil exporting
countries.
In this section I have focused on absolute (commodity based) poverty. Falling poverty
rates based on absolute poverty lines do not necessarily indicate that over time fewer people
are feeling poor. The feeling of being poor is often relative. So people may feel poorer even
if they are gaining in absolute terms as long as they fall behind others. People may also fail
to notice a decrease in poverty if their expectations are increasing. This is the reason why
absolute poverty lines are revised upwards over time and why richer countries have higher
absolute poverty lines. However, as an objective measure of how welfare has changed in Iran
22This view is prevalent among the Iranian Left. See the papers in Raisdana et al. (2000) for a sample of
writings on poverty.
21the results of this section serve their purpose. Certain aspects of the subjective comparisons
of welfare are better captured by changes in inequality rather than poverty, to which I now
turn.
5 Inequality
Poverty is only one half of the twin explanation for the return to populism in Iran, the
other half being rising inequality. The same policies that have helped reduce poverty do not
necessarily reduce inequality. In this section I examine the evolution of inequality in the last
three decades using two standard measures of inequality, the Gini index and the relative
shares of the top 10 to bottom 10 percent. These measures of inequality are available only
at the household level for the 1970s, so in the pre- and post-Revolution comparison I work
with hosuehold level data. For 1984-04, when unit record data exists, I can present the
preferred individual level measures of inequality.
The ¯ndings show that the Islamic government's success in poverty reduction does not
extent to inequality. Poverty reduction, while an important achievement, is unsurprising
when oil prices are rising and the economy is growing. Reduction in inequality is more
complicated for inequality may worsen at times of growth, as it happened in 1970s Iran,
when rising oil revenues seem to have favored the rich over the poor. Since 1984 inequality
has been quite stable. The oil boom of 2000-04 has actually reduced inequality somewhat,
which is signi¯cant for the populism thesis, and as contrast to the oil boom of the 1970s.
Economic growth in China and India has reduced poverty but has also made the distri-
bution of income less equal. This is in line with Kuznets' famous generalization (Kuznets
1955, Milanovic 1994, Deininger and Squire 1996) which suggests that during the early
stages of economic growth inequality worsens before it improves. The dynamic of Kuznets'
curve depends on economic structure. In oil exporting countries, in addition to changes in
the distribution of productivity, the dynamics is related to access to the oil rent, which is
22in turn Economic growth under these circumstance may cause inequality to rise if related
to the distribution of political power. The Islamic Revolution brought about a large shift
in political power in Iran but there is no evidence that the distribution of political power
changed as much. Even the two presidential elections in 1997 and 2005, which seemed to
entail signi¯cant shifts in political power, may have been more of a reshu²ing of those
in power than a di®erent distribution of power. The remarkable stability of inequality of
income and expenditures in the last twenty ¯ve years lends credence to these conjectures.
5.1 Inequality of household expenditures
As just noted, to compare of pre- and post-Revolution inequality I have to rely on household-
level measures because all published estimates of inequality for the years before 1984 are at
the household level. A comparison based on expenditures per capita is preferable because
it is not a®ected by changes in the distribution of household size by income.23 After 1990
household composition in Iran started to change as fertility declined. A di®erent demo-
graphic phenomenon may a®ect the accuracy of tracking inequality at the household level.
Rural-urban migration in the 1970s added disproportionately to the number of younger and
poorer families in urban areas, thereby reducing family size at the lower end of the urban
expenditure distribution. This might explain why the distribution of expenditures is less
equal at the household level than individual.
Figure 5 presents estimates of the Gini coe±cient of inequality of household expenditures
obtained from published studies for 1971-1983 and my own calculations from HEIS unit
record data.24 The largest shifts in the distribution of income in recent times took place
23This di®erence seems particularly signi¯cant for rural areas: the estimated Gini coe±cient for rural
household expenditures in 1984, reported by Behdad (1989), is 0.43 which is signi¯cantly higher than what
I have estimated from unit record data for per capita expenditures.
24A frequent complaint against the use of HEIS data for measurement of inequality in Iran is that they
underestimate income and expenditures at the higher end of the distribution. One could also think of the
same happening at the lower end because the poor do not generally keep good records, so in balance the
bias in inequality may not be that large. In any case, while estimates of inequality at a given point in time
may be a®ected by measurement bias, the comparison over time is less a®ected because the method of HEIS
data collection has remained the same over time.
































Source: 1971-73: Pesaran (1976); 1977-83: Behdad (1989); 1984-04: author's calculations using HEIS data
¯les, various years.
before the Revolution, during the oil boom (Pesaran and Gahvary 1978). Between 1972 and
1977 the Gini index of inequality rose from 0.4 to 0.5 in urban areas and from 0.37 to 0.44 in
rural areas. The Gini index declined immediately after the Revolution, to about 0.4 for both
rural and urban areas (also noted in Behdad 1989 and Nowshirvani and Clawson 1994), but
rose slightly in the 1980s. These changes in inequality mirror the fall and rise in poverty in
the 1980s. Since the end of the war with Iraq household-level inequality has been relatively
stable. Urban inequality which was higher than rural inequality before the Revolution, has
been generally below rural inequality for the last twenty years. In contrast to the oil boom
of the 1970s, which brought greater inequality, the latest oil-induced expansion of 2000-2004
did not change the level of inequality; if anything it seems to have lowered it.
A similar evolution of inequality at the household level is presented in Figure 6 which
depicts the more intuitive measure of inequality, the ratio of the share of the top to the
bottom 10 percent of the households (this measure is not available to push the comparison













































Source: 1977-83: Behdad (1989), 1984-04: author's calculations using HEIS data ¯les, various years.
reliably to the early 1970s). The decile share ratio for urban households fell from over 28
to about 18 immediately after the Revolution, then rose to above 20 in the 1980s, before
falling to below 15 in 2002. The ratio for rural households exhibits more variation compared
to urban, °uctuating widely between 18 and 32 during 1977-1992, before declining to less
than 20 in 2000. The rise of the ratio for rural households in the early reconstruction years,
resulted in the largest contrast in inequality between the rural and urban areas in 1992,
pushing the national ratio to over 25. The rise in rural inequality during the 1990-92, which
is evident in both Figures 5 and 6, is consistent with the claims made by the critics of market
reforms in Iran regarding the adverse consequences of reforms for inequality. However,
other claims regarding increase in poverty and urban inequality in the later periods are
contradicted by these data.
































Source: Author's calculations using HEIS data ¯les, various years.
5.2 Inequality of per capita expenditures
For reasons mentioned earlier, individual-level measures provide a more accurate picture of
inequality. The Gini index of per capita expenditures for the 1984-04 period (Figure 7), is
more stable than household-level expenditures seen above, showing little or no downward
trend. The di®erence is consistent with the observation made earlier that in the last ¯fteen
years poorer families have become smaller at a faster rate than richer families, resulting
in lower inequality between individuals compared to households. The decile ratios for in-
equality of per capita expenditures also show more stability compared to household-level
expenditures (Figure 8). Interestingly, in contrast to household-level inequality, individual
level inequality indicates that urban inequality is greater than rural inequality for most of
the period, especially in the last ten years.
A more direct way of showing how inequality among individuals has changed over time
is to measure the growth rate of per capita expenditures (pce) for di®erent deciles of pce.
26Figure 8: The share of the richest decile of per capita expenditures relative to the poorest
decile, 1984-04












































Source: Author's calculations using HEIS data ¯les, various years.
27Table 4 shows that during 1984-2004 individuals in lower deciles have done well compared
to those in higher deciles. Nationwide, the lowest deciles lost less in the downturn of 1984-89
and did no worse in the subsequent recovery of 1990-2004. However, the nationwide data
hides divergent trends in urban and rural areas. For urban individuals, those in the lowest
decile actually did much worse, losing nearly 9.3 percent per year during 1984-89, compared
to the richer deciles. However, they did relatively better during the ensuing recovery, as
well as in the entire 20 year period. In contrast, individuals in the lowest rural decile lost
less than the average during the downturn (-2.2 percent per year) and gained signi¯cantly
more during the next ¯ve years of recovery (4.4 percent). These observations conform to the
point noted earlier that rural incomes have generally been more stable and more resistant
to aggregate economic shocks. The very di®erent consumption paths of the poorest decile




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Poverty and income distribution measures based on consumption are generally preferred
to measures based on income for a number of reasons. First, many individuals feel more
comfortable providing information to interviewers about their expenditures than income,
especially when they respond to questions about expenditures on detailed items as is the
case with HEIS. Second, in developing countries income from self employment and farm
operations are less accurately reported than wage and salary income because bookkeeping
is rudimentary. As a result, estimates for the level of inequality in any given year may be less
accurate than expenditures, but as with expenditures they are more reliable in determining
the trend because the caveats just noted apply to all years equally. Working with income
data is valuable because it allows us to distinguish between inequality of earnings and
transfers and ask if the latter are equality-enhancing or not, and if increase in education
in the last two decades has increased or decreased equality of earnings. The analysis of
inequality of income and earnings is con¯ned to the 1984-04 period, when unit record data
is available. No estimates of inequality of income is available for the earlier years.
The trend as well as the level of inequality of per capita household incomes (earnings
plus transfers) is surprisingly similar to expenditures (Figures 9 and Table 10). The short
term variation of Gini indices for rural and urban incomes closely follow each other and the
overall trend for both is constant. As with expenditures, the income inequality variations
do not carry a particular message. There is a pronounced increase in inequality during
the early 1990s, when oil incomes increased and the country engaged in heavy external
borrowing, and also a (more moderate) rise in 1999, just after oil prices hit a twenty year
low in 1998. But the oil boom of 2000-04 seems to have been good for equality.
Finally, consider the level of inequality in per capita household earnings depicted in
Figures 10. Interestingly, inequality in earnings is signi¯cantly higher than for either in-
comes or expenditures. The Gini index for urban individuals in 2004 is 0.42 for per capita
expenditures, 0.43 for per capita income, but 0.51 for per capita household earnings (Table
30Figure 9: The Gini index of inequality of per capita household income, 1984-04
































Note: Total household income, including monetary and in-kind transfers.
Source: Author's calculations using HEIS data ¯les, various years.
Figure 10: The Gini index of inequality of per capita household earnings


































Note: Earnings include income from wage and salary work and self employment.
Source: Author's calculations using HEIS data ¯les, various years.



































Note: Earnings include income from wage and salary work and self employment.
Source: Author's calculations using HEIS data ¯les, various years.
10). The level of inequality in earnings is even higher if we con¯ne our measure to inequal-
ity between individual earners (see Figure 11) rather than per capita household earnings.
Earnings inequality between rural individuals is much greater than urban individuals (0.65
compared to 0.5 in 2004). In fact for urban areas inequality of incomes is roughly the same
whether we measure it with per capita household earnings or individual earnings, but not
so for rural areas. The increase in inequality of individual earnings after the end of the war
in 1989 is quite remarkable. What is interesting is that the rise in inequality is much less
pronounced in per expenditures and income than in individual earnings, implying that var-
ious transfers and unearned incomes helped temper the rise in inequality as market reforms
in the 1990s created greater dispersion of earnings.
To summarize the results on inequality, the evidence presented in this section shows
that on one hand the last ten years of economic growth, and even the oil boom in its latter
half, have been good for equality as they have lifted all individuals more or less equally.
On the other hand, in contrast to poverty, there has been little progress toward greater
32equality in thirty years of revolutionary and redistributive policies. At the household level,
the Gini index in 2004 is about the same as it was in 1971-72. At the individual level, too,
we observe a fair degree of stability for the last 20 years for which we have micro data.
The revolution's impact was merely to reverse the increase in inequality that occurred in
the late 1970s. Apparently, overall inequality in Iran has not been only resilient to policy
changes but also to the revolution itself. A possible lesson from this observation is that,
unlike poverty, inequality is more structural and therefore more resilient; a social revolution
could not a®ect it, much less incremental policy. There is no doubt that the Revolution
displaced many from their place on the economic ladder, sometimes violently, but perhaps
because the economic ladder on which individuals must in the end ¯nd their place remained
the same, the distribution did not change. Di®erent people stand on the higher rungs of
the ladder but the ladder itself has changed little.
6 Access to services and home appliances
Improvements in living standards are only partially measured by changes in household
incomes and expenditures. Neither include allowances for public investment, which shifted
its focus to rural and poorer communities. Public investments have increased access by the
poor, especially in rural areas, to basic services such as electricity, piped water, and natural
gas. The value of these services are not fully re°ected in household income or expenditures,
in part because they are highly subsidized. In this section I provide evidence on how access
to basic services has changed for di®erent income groups. The e®ect of increased access
to electricity and water on the quality of life is in part re°ected in ownership of home
appliances. I show that ownership of appliances that use electricity such as refrigerators
and washing machines have increased even among the lowest expenditure quintile. I also
show that despite rapid population growth the rate of home ownership has remained stable
while living space has increased on average and for the poorest group.
33Tables 5 shows changes in indicators of housing, appliance ownership and access to
basic services for the average household over time as they are re°ected in HEIS survey
data. According to these indicators, there has been a signi¯cant increase in access to basic
services and availability of household appliances. Home ownership has remained high despite
rising urbanization which tends to promote rental housing, but living area per person has
increased. The rural-urban gap in access to basic services has narrowed, which is in the
opposite direction than per capita expenditures (compare with Figure 2), leaving the change
in the overall welfare gap between rural and urban areas ambiguous. An ambitious program
of rural electri¯cation has increased access by rural households from 16.2 percent in 1977 to
98.3 percent in 2004. This change is responsible for other improvements recorded in Table
5. For example, ownership of refrigerators in rural areas increased from 7.6 percent to 92.4
percent during the same period. Among urban households, nearly all of whom had access
to eccentricity by 1977, only 36.5 percent owned refrigerators; by 2004 it was 98.5 percent.
Ownership of televisions increased in both urban and rural areas, from 22.6 percent to 97.5
percent in urban and 3.2 percent to 89.1 percent in rural areas. Interestingly, TV ownership
in urban areas, where access to electricity already existed, jumped from 22.6 percent to 79.0
percent in just seven years, perhaps because it received the stamp of approval from religious
leaders. Nearly half of rural homes had a ¯xed telephone line in 2004, up from less than
one percent before the Revolution.
Access to piped water in rural areas increased from 11.7 to 89.0 percent of households,
an impressive gain in view of the fact that rural families live in over 60,000 villages some
of which are quite remote. Delivery of cheap piped natural gas to residential homes, which
started after the Revolution, is now a reality for 80.1 percent of urban homes. The geo-
graphic dispersion of rural households makes it very costly to extend the same services to
rural households, of whom only 14.1 percent have access to piped natural gas. In housing,
despite rapidly increasing population, in the last two decades average living area per person
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Have the poor experienced improvements in basic services and ownership of home appli-
ances to the same extent as the average family? This question can be answered for the years
after 1984 for which unit record data are available. Changes in the indicators of interest for
di®erent expenditure quintiles are presented in Figure 12 (and in Table 11 in Appendix B).
Ownership of household appliances and access to basic services for poorer households (quin-
tile 1) have increased at least as much as for richer households (quintile 5). In urban areas,
by 2004 di®erences between the top and bottom quintiles had decreased considerably. The
rich and poor households had about equal access to basic services, except for natural gas.
Nearly two-third of households in all expenditure quintiles own their homes. The bottom
quintile enjoyed an ownership rate of 63 percent for telephone, 93.4 percent for TV, 95.7
percent for refrigerators, and 33.4 percent for washing machines. Nearly all had access to
electricity and piped water, and 62.8 percent were hooked up to the natural gas network.
In rural areas, too, except for natural gas, there is a high degree of basic service delivery
to poorer homes. In 2004, 95 percent of the poorest quintile of households had access
to electricity, 79.4 percent to water. Because of the wide dispersion of over 60,000 rural
communities scattered across the country, only 7.7 percent had been hooked up to the
natural gas network. In ownership of basic appliances, poorer households naturally lag
behind, as they have less income to buy them with. Nevertheless they have made signi¯cant
gains. TV ownership among the lowest quintile increased from 7 percent in 1984 to 76.7



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This paper describes the extent of poverty and inequality in Iran and how they have evolved
in the last three decades. The comparison of economic welfare for the poor before and after
the Revolution shows a general improvement with much lower poverty and no increase in
inequality. The drastic economic losses of the ¯rst decade of the Revolution have been
reversed by economic growth in the last 15 years, restoring average incomes to their pre-
revolutionary level. However, for the poor, economic recovery has meant much more than
restoration of prior living standards; they have gained in income, consumption, and access
to basic services. Publicly provided basic services, such as electricity and safe water, have
made it possible for the poor to own home appliances and for public health and family
planning services to reach poorer rural and urban areas. Investments in public health have
resulted in substantial decline in infant mortality and lower fertility. Whether these gains
would have happened anyway or are considered the product of the Revolution is impossible
to say, but the question goes to the heart of the issue raised at the beginning of this paper
regarding the roots of economic dissatisfaction in Iran. This paper provides evidence about
why they might think of the Revolution as something worth preserving.
The timing of declines in poverty, economic reform, and increases in oil income o®er
additional lessons. There is little evidence to support the thesis that economic reforms
during the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations have left the poor behind and have
thereby contributed to a populist backlash in the 2005 presidential election. In fact, this
period coincided with substantial decline in poverty. It is di±cult, however, to decide
on the extent to which reforms were actually responsible for decline in poverty. While a
number of policies favored the poor, it may have been increases in oil incomes that played
the critical role in poverty reduction. These policies ranged from subsidy for food, energy,
and medicine, to investment in electricity and water, to health and family planning. More
detailed analysis of the data is needed to evaluate the e®ects of speci¯c programs or policies
38on poverty.
If the rise of populism is not a reaction to rising poverty and inequality or economic
reform, what political lessons can reformers derive from recent history? Immediately after
the 2005 presidential election, many blamed reformers' electoral defeat on their focus on
democratic reforms instead of economic justice. Michael Ignatie® described the dilemma
felt by reformers in Iran as follows: \The political task ahead for the liberal thinkers of
Iran is to ¯nd a program that links human rights and democracy to the poor's economic
grievances."25 If the assumption that neglect of the poor fueled popular discontent lacks
empirical support, the change in focus suggested by Ignatie® may not be the cure. The
right political strategy depends on a correct identi¯cation of the root causes of economic
discontent in Iran. The experience of the last three decades provides several reasons why
various segments of the society should feel disappointed and dissatis¯ed. One obvious
reason is faulty subjective comparisons. Dissatis¯ed Iranians who complain to visitors and
reporters conveying the impression of living in desperate times, are unaware of how Iran
compares to other countries in terms of income and poverty. A very di®erent impression
was provided above in Table 1. Most Iranians now have but a foggy memory of life before
the Revolution. Lacking objective criteria to compare the quality of life in present day
Iran with that in the 1970s, many depress themselves by using for comparison either an
imaginary pre-Revolutionary Iran or some present day advanced country which a distant
relative calls home.
A more objective source of dissatisfaction is high youth unemployment. About one
quarter of men and half of women in ages 20-24 were unemployed in 2004 (Salehi-Isfahani
2005). Since the burden of youth unemployment is borne by families who support their
children well into their late twenties, economic dissatisfaction spreads to all ages. Another
reason for youth dissatisfaction, demonstrated by Marku and Salehi-Isfahani (2006), is the
decline in lifetime earnings relative to their predecessors of cohorts who entered adult life
25\Iranian lessons", New York Times, July 17, 2005.
39at the time of the Revolution. While average incomes have recovered their pre-Revolution
level, not all cohorts experience it.
Increase in economic insecurity, even for social groups who have bene¯ted from recent
growth, may have caused individual anxiety to overcome collective gains. Lower poverty
and stable inequality are compatible with increased insecurity. When the economic reforms
began in the early 1990s, about 60 percent of wage and salary workers were employed in
the public sector, compared to 40 percent in 2004 (Salehi-Isfahani 2005). Public sector jobs
o®ered more security and were coveted often despite lower pay. Labor market regulations
intended to make private sector jobs more secure have failed in practice as employers have
shifted to o®ering short term contracts and part time work. Signi¯cantly, an early move
by the Ahmadinejad government was to prevent short term employment contracts in state-
owned companies. The reform of foreign trade in recent years, which ended non-tari®
barriers and lowered the average tari® rate, have increased competitive pressures from East
Asia on some sectors of Iran's economy, notably textiles, and reduced job security for lower
skilled workers. These competitive pressures have worsened with increase in oil revenues
which have opened the gates to cheap imports from East Asia.
There is also the interesting possibility, suggested by the polarization literature (Duclos,
Esteban, and Ray 2004), that Iranian society may be more polarized even though it is more
egalitarian. The poor are not only better o® now but they are also more similar to each
other{all have basic education, access to basic services, refrigerator and television. At the
same time, as a group they still remain distinct from other social groups, perhaps on cultural
grounds such as attachment to western ideas and way of life. Thus polarization may have
increased along social lines while economically the society has become more equal.
Finally, economic growth in a distributive society relying on oil rents, especially one also
imbued with a deep sense of economic justice, such as Iran's, may create envy and frustra-
tion. In such an economy individual incomes may increase not only with higher productivity
but also as a result of better rent seeking. Lack of economic transparency, in part inherent
40to the rent seeking process, exacerbates envy. Most Iranians who express dissatisfaction
with their economic system seem to have exaggerated ideas about the size of oil income
and are suspicious of how it is distributed. Wild speculations about accumulation of wealth
by Iranians inside and outside Iran is indicative of how little information exists about the
size and the distribution of the oil rent in Iran.26 Not surprisingly, corruption rather than
reliance on markets is the main reason why Iranians suspect the oil money has not found
its way to their dinner table, to paraphrase Ahmadinejad's e®ective election slogan. For
decades large oil rents have blurred the connection between individual productivity and
income. Because rewards appear detached from productivity, individuals lack a ¯rm basis
on which to build their aspirations and expectations. The faster the rise in average incomes,
the larger they infer must be the pie that is being divided, and greater the possibility that
one's own share of the bounty is not large enough. Reduction in poverty would seems less
impressive if the poor believed that their gains were small relative to others. Under these
circumstances, economic growth, even when it lifts all incomes evenly, may create social
envy and resentment and even lead to political instability. It is a remarkable but little
noticed fact that signi¯cant popular political shifts in Iran, ¯rst in late 1970s and again in
2005, have taken place during economic booms. One possible explanation for such shifts
toward populism is the understandable tendency of the lower classes to turn to a leader with
a modest personal fortune (Khomeini in 1979 and Ahmadinezad in 2005) at times when the
state is in a position to dispose of a large amount of oil money. Lack of transparency in the
Iranian economy in general, and about how the oil rent is distributed in particular, thus
fuels envy and complicates politics precisely at times when the economy is posed for rapid
growth.
These possibilities suggest the need to examine and test more complex reasons for the
recent shift to populism in Iran against data than widespread poverty and increasing inequal-
ity. Abandoning economic reform by going back to the policies of the 1980s{re-introducing
26A recent article in the New York Times (\Young Iranians Follow Dreams to Dubai," December 4, 2005)
reported claims by Iranians of $200 billion invested by Iranian in Dubai.
41price controls and spending even more on subsidies{may be the wrong lesson to learn from
the setback su®ered by reformists at the polls in 2005. At this point we simply do not know
enough about the links between economic change and social and political change in Iran to
draw such conclusions.
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45A Data
Household Expenditure and Income Surveys (HEIS) have been conducted annually by the
Statistical Center of Iran (SCI) since 1963 in rural areas and 1968 in urban areas. They are
available in unit record from since 1984. All surveys are nationally representative but not
all households have equal probability of selection. The sampling method is Probabilities
Proportional to Size (PPS). The sample is strati¯ed according to rural and urban residence
which, in e®ect, treats the rural and urban surveys as separate surveys even though they
have the same questionnaires and are collected on the same schedule. Sampled households
are distributed evenly throughout the year with 1/12 of households surveyed each month.
Both samples (rural and urban) are cluster based. First, the number of observations (house-
holds) for each province is determined based on the province population and variance of the
variables of interest in the province. The latter consideration implies that not all households
have the same probability of selection into the survey. Therefore sampling weights equal to
the inverse of probability of selection must be used in all statistical calculations. Second,
the number of primary sampling units (PSU) in each province is determined by dividing
the sample size for the province by 5. PSU's correspond to census tracts, which are chosen
randomly, and from each of which 5 households are randomly selected. Sample sizes vary
from 5,759 households in 1986 to 36,591 in 1995. The total number of households in the
combined data set is about 433,000 households and about 2.3 million individuals.
The survey questionnaires contain eight sections. Section 1 is the demographics module,
which asks about age, sex, marital status, relationship to the head of the household, edu-
cation, and employment status of individuals. Section 2 contains information on household
ownership of assets and amenities. Section 3 records very detailed information on food ex-
penditures; food expenditures can be aggregated into broader groups such as grains, meats,
dairy, and so on. Section 4 reports on non-food expenditures, including non-durable and
semi-durable goods such as clothing and other household goods, as well as rent and utilities.
The recall period for these expenditures is the last 30 days, which is rather long for consump-
tion (in some earlier surveys the recall period for food was only the last two days). Section
5 records expenditures on durables, which include appliances, furniture, vehicles, bikes, as
well as expenditures on vacation travel, school tuition, or housing extension. Modules 6, 7,
and 8 record individual information on wage and salary income, self-employment income,
and other income from retirement, rent, or other sources, respectively. Expenditures include
implied rent but not the value of services provided by consumer durable goods. However,
expenditures on durables for each year are included, which provides a good approximation
for the distribution of durable services for households in a given year.
B Tables
46Table 6: Gross Domestic Production and Consumption Per Capita, 1955-2004
GDPPC Penn GDPPC CBI GDPPC WDI PrivateCPC
(1996 PPP$) (1997 rialsx1000) (2000 PPP$) (1997 rialsx1000)
1955 1,736.1 { { {
1956 1,769.2 { { {
1957 1,969.7 { { {
1958 2,091.0 { { {
1959 2,279.8 2,077.2 { 1,277.3
1960 2,668.3 2,232.0 { 1,220.2
1961 2,679.3 2,335.0 { 1,187.7
1962 2,938.1 2,417.6 { 1,174.8
1963 3,010.7 2,485.8 { 1,152.9
1964 3,053.0 2,599.1 { 1,078.4
1965 3,434.2 2,926.0 { 1,093.7
1966 3,567.2 3,109.5 { 1,157.4
1967 3,781.7 3,346.2 { 1,246.3
1968 4,129.1 3,644.2 { 1,196.0
1969 4,465.3 3,989.3 { 1,257.6
1970 5,225.0 4,255.8 { 1,350.6
1971 4,935.6 4,697.4 { 1,508.7
1972 5,433.5 5,326.3 { 1,551.4
1973 5,884.4 5,559.1 { 1,711.1
1974 5,606.6 6,075.0 { 2,035.7
1975 5,024.5 6,181.5 6,984.0 2,605.7
1976 5,899.1 7,051.2 7,976.0 2,528.2
1977 5,217.4 6,678.4 7,626.0 2,606.0
1978 5,132.8 5,991.1 6,547.0 2,558.9
1979 4,943.0 5,542.6 5,823.0 2,546.4
1980 4,028.6 4,529.6 4,897.0 2,339.1
1981 3,618.8 4,156.7 4,586.0 2,317.5
1982 4,211.2 4,482.9 5,097.0 2,392.8
1983 4,107.5 4,768.4 5,549.0 2,635.4
1984 4,206.4 4,479.3 5,377.0 2,672.7
1985 4,435.5 4,392.8 5,266.0 2,616.3
1986 4,080.0 3,847.4 4,620.0 2,262.9
1987 3,895.5 3,681.0 4,476.0 2,063.5
1988 3,769.7 3,371.0 4,156.0 2,019.5
1989 3,711.7 3,468.5 4,230.0 2,028.1
1990 3,881.7 3,856.1 4,598.0 2,031.1
1991 4,027.8 4,223.9 5,015.0 2,208.7
1992 4,301.3 4,302.5 5,236.0 2,292.8
1993 4,591.5 4,286.2 5,268.0 2,350.8
1994 4,963.3 4,235.4 5,251.0 2,379.6
1995 5,013.1 4,292.6 5,295.0 2,344.3
1996 5,333.2 4,487.8 5,402.0 2,247.2
1997 5,458.4 4,551.4 5,606.0 2,303.2
1998 5,538.5 4,623.4 5,641.0 2,418.8
1999 5,670.5 4,643.5 5,647.0 2,442.2
2000 5,994.6 4,822.9 5,576.0 2,572.6
2001 { 4,934.0 5,738.0 2,639.2
2002 { 5,257.6 6,277.0 2,895.9
2003 { 5,559.6 6,608.0 2,969.9
2004 { 5,774.5 6,983.0 3,168.3
Sources: Summers, Heston, and Aten (2002), World Bank (2005), Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report,
various years. 47Table 7: Per capita income and expenditures per day in 2004 rials, 1974-2004
income expenditures
Rural Urban Rural Urban
1974 8525 18218 12775 22901
1975 9815 28948 13508 30075
1976 9098 28149 11448 28392
1977 10013 27350 12475 26709
1978 10231 { 12501 {
1979 10056 25189 13599 25862
1980 { 24133 { 21623
1981 { { { {
1982 10210 19201 13169 23906
1983 10513 22064 13626 26742
1984 10145 22769 12970 27311
1985 10285 22508 13122 27779
1986 9366 20415 12545 23820
1987 9190 13505 11544 16479
1988 9134 13024 10639 17498
1989 9749 12215 12590 17365
1990 9720 15860 12643 18094
1991 10458 18550 12921 19972
1992 11045 19719 12925 21136
1993 10735 19948 12863 20791
1994 10530 18857 12437 20544
1995 9488 16319 12387 19666
1996 10155 18549 12097 20767
1997 11393 19542 13016 21526
1998 11582 20985 13357 23087
1999 11645 21304 13736 23757
2000 11667 23769 14015 25667
2001 12430 24833 14092 26937
2002 13639 27356 15356 28898
2003 15273 28099 16312 29380
2004 15687 30187 18871 32876
Sources: Statistical Center of Iran (http://amar.sci.org.ir)
48Table 8: Poverty lines, Consumer Price Index, and PPP exchange rates
Assadzadeh & Paul USD2 CPI PPP
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban (rials per $)
1975 46.3 65.6 76.7 76.7 0.60 0.60 38.4
1976 53.9 76.5 82.8 82.8 0.70 0.70 41.4
1977 67.4 95.6 93.1 93.1 0.88 0.88 46.5
1978 73.6 104.3 96.4 96.4 0.96 0.96 48.2
1979 82.6 117.1 113.2 113.2 1.08 1.08 56.6
1980 102.1 144.7 128.2 128.2 1.33 1.33 64.1
1981 125.4 177.7 145.9 145.9 1.63 1.63 72.9
1982 149.5 212.0 157.1 157.1 1.95 1.95 78.5
1983 171.7 243.4 169.8 169.8 2.24 2.24 84.9
1984 194.3 265.6 179.9 179.9 2.53 2.44 89.9
1985 201.2 276.5 182.6 182.6 2.62 2.54 91.3
1986 236.5 342.9 202.1 202.1 3.08 3.15 101.0
1987 301.0 437.6 241.5 241.5 3.92 4.02 120.8
1988 367.8 568.2 273.2 273.2 4.79 5.22 136.6
1989 430.0 676.0 314.2 314.2 5.60 6.21 157.1
1990 466.9 741.3 359.0 359.0 6.08 6.81 179.5
1991 537.5 885.0 428.0 428.0 7.00 8.13 214.0
1992 659.6 1073.3 508.0 508.0 8.59 9.86 254.0
1993 809.3 1353.1 757.1 757.1 10.54 12.43 378.5
1994 1162.5 1823.3 963.0 963.0 15.14 16.75 481.5
1995 1786.8 2698.6 1356.5 1356.5 23.27 24.79 678.2
1996 2185.3 3309.2 1559.1 1559.1 28.46 30.40 779.6
1997 2531.6 3892.7 1834.5 1834.5 32.97 35.76 917.3
1998 3133.6 4562.2 1948.6 1948.6 40.81 41.91 974.3
1999 3867.7 5454.8 2236.3 2236.3 50.37 50.11 1118.2
2000 4464.3 6214.6 3106.4 3106.4 58.14 57.09 1553.2
2001 4966.5 7050.6 3603.9 3603.9 64.68 64.77 1801.9
2002 5781.2 8183.8 4232.4 4232.4 75.29 75.18 2116.2
2003 6730.3 9456.4 4839.6 4839.6 87.65 86.87 2419.8
2004 7678.6 10885.7 5550.6 5550.6 100.00 100.00 2775.3
Sources: Assadzadeh and Paul (2004); CPI, the Central Bank of Iran; PPP, World Bank (2005).
49Table 9: Poverty rates
Household Individual
Assadzadeh-Paul USD2 Assadzadeh-Paul USD2
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
1977 0.426 0.283 0.657 0.275 0.426 0.251 0.595 0.244
1978 0.450 0.604 0.320 0.547
1979 0.263 0.252 0.197 0.183
1980 0.230 0.160 0.208 0.142
1981
1982 0.352 0.377 0.350 0.402
1983
1984 0.351 0.179 0.309 0.079 0.365 0.204 0.321 0.087
1985 0.339 0.187 0.288 0.078 0.356 0.214 0.301 0.089
1986 0.445 0.284 0.355 0.109 0.457 0.328 0.364 0.129
1987 0.416 0.341 0.283 0.117 0.438 0.395 0.294 0.141
1988 0.447 0.335 0.261 0.078 0.467 0.388 0.268 0.094
1989 0.432 0.347 0.252 0.090 0.445 0.400 0.254 0.107
1990 0.359 0.312 0.243 0.061 0.380 0.367 0.254 0.075
1991 0.352 0.275 0.254 0.058 0.377 0.333 0.272 0.073
1992 0.317 0.243 0.215 0.045 0.340 0.293 0.229 0.056
1993 0.331 0.237 0.294 0.060 0.357 0.290 0.317 0.079
1994 0.330 0.248 0.237 0.051 0.359 0.304 0.258 0.065
1995 0.347 0.271 0.223 0.055 0.371 0.326 0.235 0.070
1996 0.355 0.246 0.194 0.040 0.388 0.299 0.211 0.052
1997 0.315 0.220 0.173 0.031 0.344 0.270 0.191 0.041
1998 0.319 0.194 0.132 0.019 0.349 0.241 0.145 0.024
1999 0.285 0.174 0.090 0.011 0.320 0.219 0.101 0.015
2000 0.279 0.149 0.134 0.021 0.313 0.190 0.152 0.027
2001 0.272 0.146 0.142 0.020 0.306 0.187 0.161 0.029
2002 0.230 0.115 0.118 0.017 0.262 0.150 0.135 0.023
2003 0.183 0.092 0.086 0.012 0.216 0.122 0.103 0.017
2004 0.140 0.077 0.059 0.010 0.166 0.105 0.071 0.012
Note: Per capita income includes monetary and in-kind transfers; per capita earnings is wage and salary
income plus income from self-employment.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































51Table 11: Ownership of home and appliances, and access to services by expenditure quintiles,
1984-2004
Home Living TV Car Phone Washing Refrig- Gas Elect- Water Natural
Quintile owner area machine ator stove ricity gas
Urban
1984
1 69.8 11.9 60.0 2.4 5.7 10.3 77.2 65.6 98.5 92.3 3.4
2 73.3 14.0 74.4 5.7 11.1 20.3 89.7 81.5 99.6 95.2 4.9
3 73.9 17.5 82.3 13.4 16.6 28.8 92.4 86.9 99.7 97.0 6.7
4 71.2 20.6 85.4 19.6 24.6 40.0 94.7 90.5 99.8 97.2 8.3
5 68.9 32.6 87.9 37.9 41.7 53.7 96.0 93.4 99.9 98.2 16.8
1994
1 73.6 13.3 86.1 3.3 16.6 21.6 88.3 98.9 83.4 94.4 27.6
2 73.8 18.1 93.4 6.9 31.8 35.5 95.5 99.7 92.4 98.0 35.7
3 75.4 22.0 94.8 14.2 39.7 48.3 96.3 99.9 94.5 98.8 41.3
4 73.7 27.7 96.1 22.1 54.5 61.8 97.2 99.9 96.7 99.0 48.2
5 74.4 44.0 97.1 39.5 69.9 75.6 98.6 99.9 98.0 99.6 57.5
2004
1 65.7 16.8 93.4 5.7 63.0 33.4 95.7 93.7 100.0 97.1 62.8
2 67.5 21.9 98.0 11.4 79.1 53.6 99.0 98.1 100.0 99.1 76.2
3 67.2 25.9 97.3 18.9 81.7 64.2 98.8 98.0 100.0 99.5 82.4
4 70.6 30.6 98.8 31.7 86.7 75.4 99.1 99.2 100.0 99.5 85.8
5 69.9 41.9 98.9 53.0 91.5 86.2 99.4 99.6 100.0 99.8 89.2
Rural
1984
1 88.3 . 7.1 0.2 12.7 21.0 37.0 31.0 0.1
2 91.2 . 15.0 0.5 24.5 36.5 47.8 38.3 0.2
3 90.6 . 23.5 1.1 . . 35.1 44.9 58.8 42.6 0.2
4 90.3 . 32.2 2.0 . . 43.3 54.2 64.8 47.1 0.4
5 86.8 . 48.2 10.0 . . 59.5 68.5 75.2 59.2 0.3
1994
1 87.6 12.0 49.2 0.8 0.8 2.6 49.0 74.6 54.5 58.5 0.9
2 89.4 13.3 64.8 1.6 3.6 6.0 63.9 82.1 69.5 69.5 1.6
3 88.0 15.5 70.6 3.3 5.5 10.1 72.1 84.0 74.9 72.7 2.6
4 87.0 17.6 76.6 4.0 8.2 16.8 78.0 88.0 78.9 77.4 2.4
5 86.2 22.8 78.1 11.0 11.6 25.3 80.7 88.9 84.2 81.9 3.6
2004
1 84.7 14.0 76.7 1.7 26.0 6.9 80.4 75.8 95.1 79.4 7.7
2 88.4 17.6 88.2 3.5 40.4 14.3 92.6 88.7 98.3 88.1 11.0
3 86.0 20.2 90.9 5.2 51.0 21.5 94.6 92.0 99.0 89.4 13.3
4 86.2 23.5 93.5 9.7 59.3 31.1 96.5 94.3 99.3 92.8 16.4
5 84.6 30.8 95.9 25.2 69.3 42.2 97.5 96.6 99.6 94.9 21.9
Note: Homeowner in column 2 is percent who own their home; living area in column 3 is square meters per
person; all other columns are percents.
Source: Author's calculations using HEIS, various years.
52